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Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause
Kevin Bennardo*
INTRODUCTION
Restitution is an important component of a criminal offender’s
sentence. Increasingly, it is imposed mandatorily and encompasses an
ever-widening scope of payments.1 Because courts commonly impose
restitution regardless of the offender’s ability to pay,2 it is often the last
part of an offender’s sentence to be discharged. Yet the constitutional
limits of a sentencing court’s ability to impose a restitution order on a
criminal defendant are murky. The seemingly straightforward question of
whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to
restitution orders has not been answered, despite the fact that both have
been around for well over 200 years.
This Article offers solutions to further the conversation regarding the
Eighth Amendment’s limits on restitution. The Excessive Fines Clause
applies to payments that involve sufficient governmental involvement and
are at least partially punitive.3 Criminal restitution satisfies both
components and therefore falls within the compass of the Clause. To test
for constitutional excessiveness, the amount of the restitution order should
be aggregated with other monetary payments that constitute the Eighth
Amendment “fine.” That cumulative fine should then be weighed against
the gravity of the defendant’s offense conduct for gross disproportionality.
Restitution should not be subjected to a special causation-based
excessiveness test because causation is predominantly relevant to the
compensatory aspect of restitution, not to its punitive aspect.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of restitution systems and
statutes in the United States. Part II provides an overview of the case law
interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Part III
discusses how the Excessive Fines Clause should be applied to restitution
in criminal cases.

Copyright 2016, by KEVIN BENNARDO.
 Clinical Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School
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Louisiana Law Review and Pugh Institute’s joint sentencing symposium for their
perspectives.
1. See Cortney E. Lollar, Punitive Compensation, 51 TULSA L. REV. 99,
103–04 (2015).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.A, C.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
Criminal restitution systems take various forms in the United States.
These systems have several defining characteristics: the types of offenses
that authorize restitution, the persons who are eligible to receive restitution
payments, the types of harms or losses that are recoverable in restitution,
and whether an order of restitution is mandatory, discretionary, or subject
to exceptions.
In the federal system, a court may order restitution for the violation of
any offense.4 The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 19965 (“MVRA”)
requires mandatory restitution for a wide range of offenses. Examples include
crimes of violence;6 offenses against property; offenses relating to tampering
with consumer products; and offenses relating to theft of medical products, as
long as at least one identifiable victim has suffered a physical injury or
pecuniary loss.7 Other statutory provisions mandate restitution for specific
offenses, including sexual abuse;8 sexual exploitation and other abuse of
children;9 domestic violence and stalking;10 telemarketing fraud;11 peonage,
slavery, and human trafficking;12 and failure to pay child support
obligations.13
Restitution is generally recoverable by the “victim” of an offense.14 The
MVRA defines a victim as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a
result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be

4. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2012) (permitting restitution for all offenses
under Title 18, violations of the Controlled Substances Act, and criminal
violations of Title 49 relating to air piracy); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3556 (2012).
Restitution may also be ordered as a condition of probation or supervised release.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(2), 3583(d)(3) (2012).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012).
6. A crime of violence is an offense that either “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another” or “is a felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force again the person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1) (2012).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (2012).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2012).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (2012).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2327 (2012).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2012).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 228(d) (2012).
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2012).
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ordered.”15 In the case of a scheme or conspiracy, a victim includes “any
person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of
the scheme [or] conspiracy.”16 The court may appoint another individual to
assume the victim’s rights if the victim is a minor or otherwise
incompetent.17 The victim need not be an individual, and the government
may be eligible to recover restitution as the victim.18 If the victim is
deceased, restitution is payable to the victim’s estate.19 The defendant can
also agree to pay restitution to persons other than the statutory victim of the
offense.20
To be recoverable, the loss must be the proximate result of the offense.21
By the parties’ agreement, the court may order restitution to recompense
losses caused by activity for which the defendant was not charged or
convicted.22 For property damage, restitution may take the form of returning
the property or compensating the victim for the value of the property.23
Restitution for bodily injury may include “the cost of necessary medical
and related professional services and devices relating to physical,
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id. The defendant cannot be appointed as the representative of the victim. Id.
18. See United States v. Ekahem, 383 F.3d 40, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming
order of restitution to the United States Department of Agriculture); United States
v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming order of restitution to the
United States Post Office); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-3(h) (West 2016)
(requiring restitution order “[i]n any case where the victim of the offense is any
department or division of State government”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27(9)
(McKinney 2016) (defining “victim” to include state law enforcement agencies
when the offense is a felony involving the sale of a controlled substance). When
multiple victims of an offense in Minnesota exist, non-governmental entities
receive priority when ordering restitution. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.045(1)(b)
(West 2016).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2012).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2012).
21. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248(b)(3)(F), 2259(b)(3)(F), 2264(b)(3)(F), 2327(b)(3),
3663A(a)(2) (2012).
22. Under the MVRA, restitution can be mandated when the parties agree
that the defendant’s commission of a listed offense gave rise to the plea
agreement, even if the conviction is not for a listed offense. See 18 U.S.C. §
3663A(c)(2) (2012); see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2280 (West 2016)
(permitting an order for restitution of losses “sustained by the victim of an
uncharged offense or an offense dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations” with
consent of the parties).
23. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(1), 3663A(b)(1) (2012).
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psychiatric, and psychological care,”24 “the cost of necessary physical and
occupational therapy and rehabilitation,”25 and reimbursement for income
lost because of the offense.26 If the offense results in death, a restitution
order may include “the cost of necessary funeral and related services.”27
Regardless of the offense, restitution may include payments to offset other
expenses or lost income incurred from participating in the investigation or
prosecution of the offense.28 Certain offenses also lead to the mandatory
repayment of other expenses, such as attorney’s fees, temporary housing and
child care expenses, and “any other losses suffered by the victim as a
proximate result of the offense.”29 When a restitution order is discretionary,
the victim may consent to restitution paid in services instead of money, or
paid to another person or organization.30 When restitution is mandatory,
however, whether the victim may decline to receive the payment is
unclear.31
Some statutes identify circumstances in which the court should refrain
from ordering restitution. The MVRA directs courts not to order restitution
when “the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution
impracticable”32 or when determining causation or the amount of the
victim’s losses would so complicate the sentencing process “that the need
to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the
sentencing process.”33 Many states have quasi-mandatory restitution
statutes that require the sentencing court to impose restitution unless the

24. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(2)(A), 3663A(b)(2)(A) (2012).
25. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(2)(B), 3663A(b)(2)(B) (2012).
26. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(2)(C), 3663A(b)(2)(C) (2012).
27. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(3), 3663A(b)(3) (2012).
28. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(b)(4), 3663A(b)(4) (2012).
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248(b)(3), 2259(b)(3), 2264(b)(3) (2012).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(5) (2012).
31. Compare United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230, 245 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that the MVRA “requires restitution regardless of the consent of victims”
and that the sentencing court can assign the victim’s interest in the restitution
payment to the Crime Victims Fund), with United States v. Speakman, 594 F.3d
1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that “courts are not required to order
restitution if the victim declines the restitution without assigning her interest to
the [Crime Victims] Fund”). Some state statutes that otherwise mandate
restitution explicitly permit a court to decline to order restitution if the victim
declines it. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.045(a) (West 2016).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(A) (2012).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B) (2012).
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court finds the existence of a circumstance enumerated in state law.34 For
example, in Maryland, a victim who suffered a loss as a result of an offense
presumptively has the right to restitution, but the court may decline to
order restitution if the offender does not have the ability to pay or if another
extenuating circumstance would render restitution inappropriate.35 In
Maine, a court cannot order restitution to be paid to a victim who was an
accomplice in the offense or who has been compensated from another
source.36 If a court declines to impose restitution, it is often required to
detail its reasons on the record.37
Several other considerations guide courts in determining the amount
of restitution paid, if any. Numerous statutes direct the court to consider
the financial burden of a restitution order.38 Some states authorize a court
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1)(a) (West 2016) (requiring restitution
unless the court finds clear and compelling reasons); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5304(2)
(West 2016) (requiring restitution unless the court finds it inappropriate or
undesirable); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6604(b)(1) (West 2016) (requiring restitution
unless the court finds “compelling circumstances which would render a plan of
restitution unworkable”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 92A (West 2016)
(permitting court to decline to impose restitution for motor vehicle theft “in
extraordinary cases”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-4(a) (West 2016) (requiring
restitution unless the court finds it “to be wholly or partially impractical”).
35. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. §§ 11-603(b), 11-605(a) (West 2016).
36. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1325(2) (2016). Because Maine
recognizes that restitution is “ancillary to the central objectives of criminal law,”
Maine authorizes restitution only “when other purposes of sentencing can be
appropriately served.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (2016).
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 775.089(1)(b) (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
19-5304(3) (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6604(b)(1) (West 2016); MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-605(b) (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
276, § 92A (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1323(2) (2016); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-37-3(4) (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(3) (West
2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-4(a) (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9103(c) (West 2016).
38. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1325(2)(D) (2016) (prohibiting
restitution when it would create “an excessive financial hardship on the offender
or dependent of the offender”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-37-3(2) (West 2016); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2281 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(B)(1)
(2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-304(d) (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7738a-302(5)(c)(ii) (West 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.20(13)(a)(2) (West 2016);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-5(a) (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-102
(West 2016) (requiring restitution “unless the court specifically finds that the
defendant has no ability to pay and that no reasonable probability exists that the
defendant will have an ability to pay”).
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to order community service or other work instead of restitution when the
defendant is unable to pay.39 Other states disallow the court from considering
the defendant’s ability to pay40 or even from considering whether the victim
has already received compensation from another source such as insurance.41
Some offenses carry mandatory minimum restitution amounts, which are
required to be paid upon conviction without the victim showing causation or
loss.42 Some statutes apply a multiplier for certain offenses that increases the
restitution to several times the actual amount of the victim’s losses.43 For
example, in Oklahoma, the general definition of restitution is a payment
“to compensate the victim for up to three times the amount of the economic
losses suffered as a direct result of the criminal act of the defendant.”44 In
many ways, the payments that now fall under the umbrella of restitution

39. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-241 (West 2016) (crediting community
service against restitution at the rate of the state’s minimum wage); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-08(5) (West 2016) (permitting “assigned work” instead of
restitution with the consent of the person entitled to receive the restitution); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991f(O) (West 2016) (crediting community service against
restitution at a rate of five dollars per day); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-4(b)(4)
(West 2016) (offender may make restitution in services instead of money with
consent of the victim or if payments are impossible or impractical).
40. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-646(3) (West 2016); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-5304(7) (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:63(I) (2016);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991f(C)(2)(b) (West 2016); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1106(c)(1)(i) (West 2016).
41. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2248(b)(4) (2012).
42. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-68(b) (2016) (requiring restitution of at least
$50,000 for a capital offense and $10,000 for first-degree rape); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 910.3B(1) (West 2016) (requiring restitution of at least $50,000 for felony
conviction that caused the death of another person); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
12.1-32-16 (West 2016) (requiring restitution of at least $250 when a person
whose license has been suspended for non-payment of child support is convicted
of engaging in activity for which the license was required); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-28-13 (2016) (requiring restitution of at least $50 and attorney’s fees and
costs for unlawfully taking money from a store or mercantile establishment).
43. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27(12) (McKinney 2016) (allowing restitution to
property owner up to three times the stumpage value of the stolen timber); 18 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1107 (West 2016) (mandatory restitution for theft
of standing timber in an amount twice the value of the timber taken).
44. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991f(A)(1) (West 2016); see also WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.030(1) (West 2016) (capping restitution at double the
amount of the defendant’s gain or the victim’s loss).
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are much broader than the traditional repayment or disgorgement of illgotten gains.45
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
The Eighth Amendment instructs that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”46 The Excessive Fines Clause has attracted decidedly less attention
than the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Although most
excessive fines cases deal with traditional fines or forfeiture orders, challenges
under the Clause to criminal restitution orders have increased. Lower courts,
however, have not converged on a uniform treatment of restitution under the
Excessive Fines Clause.47 This Part begins with an overview of Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the Excessive Fines Clause, then turns to a discussion
of lower courts’ attempts to apply that jurisprudence to criminal restitution
orders, and concludes by discussing recent dicta that may foreshadow how the
Supreme Court would apply the Clause to restitution.
A. The Excessive Fines Clause at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court allowed the Excessive Fines Clause to speak for
itself for approximately 200 years before deciding the case of BrowningFerris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. in 1989.48 The
Browning-Ferris Court held that punitive damage awards in civil litigation
between private parties are not “fines” within the Excessive Fines
Clause.49 The Court noted that its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence had
“long understood” the amendment “to apply primarily, and perhaps
exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and punishment,”50 but found it
unnecessary to create a bright-line barrier restricting the Excessive Fines
Clause only to criminal prosecutions.51 Instead, the Court focused on the
45. See United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999) (labeling the
MVRA as “[f]unctionally . . . a tort statute”); Lollar, supra note 1 (chronicling the
transformation of restitution into “punitive compensation”); Cortney E. Lollar,
What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 101–05 (2014).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
47. See infra Part II.B.
48. 492 U.S. 257, 262 (1989) (noting that “this Court has never considered
an application of the Excessive Fines Clause”).
49. Id. at 268, 275.
50. Id. at 262.
51. Id. at 263.
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identity of the payee in the Browning-Ferris dispute.52 As a check on
governmental abuse of its prosecutorial power, the Court found that the
Excessive Fines Clause was directed at limiting “payment to a sovereign
as a punishment for some offense,”53 or at least was not implicated “when
the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to
receive a share of the damages awarded.”54 Thus, the Clause did not
encompass a punitive civil damage award payable to a private party.55
The Court revisited the Clause several years later in the twin cases of
Austin v. United States56 and Alexander v. United States57 and determined
that forfeitures fall within its scope. The distinction between the two cases
is the nature of the forfeiture order: Austin dealt with an in rem forfeiture
that was civil in nature, whereas Alexander dealt with an in personam
forfeiture that was the product of a criminal judgment.58 The Court held
that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to both types of forfeitures.
In Austin, the petitioner, Richard Lyle Austin, pleaded guilty in South
Dakota state court to one count of possessing cocaine with intent to
distribute.59 The federal government then filed a civil action in federal
court seeking in rem forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body
shop under a federal statute that provided for forfeiture of conveyances
and real property used in connection with controlled substance offenses.60
Austin argued that forfeiture of this property would violate the Excessive

52. Id. at 268.
53. Id. at 265. Although the Court agreed that punitive damage awards
“advance the interests of punishment and deterrence,” it focused on the lack of “a
positive step to punish” by the government in the case before it. Id. at 275.
Dissenting in part, Justices O’Connor and Stevens opined that punitive damages,
which both punish and deter, were sufficiently criminal in nature to warrant the
application of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 287–99 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (applying the factors developed in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) to determine that punitive damage
awards are penal).
54. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264.
55. The Court explicitly left open the question of whether the Excessive Fines
Clause would apply to qui tam suits, in which a private party brings a civil suit in
the name of the United States and shares in any award of damages. Id. at 275 n.21.
56. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
57. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
58. Id. at 558; Austin, 509 U.S. at 614–18.
59. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
60. Id. at 604–05, 605 n.1.
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Fines Clause.61 The district court ordered the property to be forfeited and
the Eighth Circuit affirmed.62
The Supreme Court characterized Browning-Ferris as recognizing the
following limitation: “[T]he Excessive Fines Clause does not limit the
award of punitive damages to a private party in a civil suit when the
government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive
a share of the damages.”63 Thus, although governmental involvement is
necessary to trigger the Excessive Fines Clause, a criminal prosecution is
not.64 Aside from sufficient governmental involvement, the key
determinant in whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies is whether the
payment is “punishment,” not whether it is criminal.65 Recognizing that
sanctions often serve multiple purposes, the Court further stated that the
Excessive Fines Clause applies if an ordered payment “can only be
explained as serving in part to punish.”66 A civil sanction that serves not
only a remedial purpose, but also furthers deterrence or retribution, is
punishment in part.67
The Court analyzed whether in rem forfeiture was understood at least
in part as punishment when the Eighth Amendment was ratified and
whether the applicable modern federal forfeiture statutes were similarly
understood as at least partially punitive.68 The Court answered both
questions in the affirmative and thus found that the Excessive Fines Clause
applied to the civil in rem forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto
body shop.69 The Court ducked the question of what test to apply to
measure whether the forfeiture was constitutionally excessive. Although
determining the proper test to use is purely a legal question, the Court

61. Austin dealt a total of two grams of cocaine during the deal for which he
was convicted. Id. at 605.
62. See United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992).
63. Austin, 509 U.S. at 606.
64. Id. at 607.
65. Id. at 610 (“[T]he question is not, as the United States would have it,
whether forfeiture under [the relevant statute] is civil or criminal, but rather
whether it is punishment.”).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 621 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989),
abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997)).
68. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610–11.
69. Id. at 622 (finding that the forfeitures qualified as “payment to a sovereign
as punishment for some offense”).
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thought it best to “allow the lower courts to consider that question in the
first instance.”70
In concurrence, Justice Scalia noted that the test for excessiveness
should be different for in rem forfeitures than for fines.71 Justice Scalia
opined that the offense of conviction was irrelevant for in rem forfeitures
because the relevant question is whether the property is “tainted” by
unlawful use, not whether the forfeited property’s value is proportional to
the offense of conviction.72 Thus, “[s]cales used to measure out unlawful
drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the purest gold
or the basest metal.”73 Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the test for
constitutionality would ask “not how much the confiscated property is
worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close enough
relationship to the offense.”74
The Alexander case, decided on the same day as Austin, was an appeal
from an in personam forfeiture ordered as part of a criminal sentence.75
The petitioner, Ferris J. Alexander, Sr., was convicted of 17 counts of
obscenity and three racketeering offenses predicated on the obscenity
convictions.76 As part of his sentence, the district court ordered forfeiture
of Alexander’s adult entertainment wholesale and retail businesses as well
as nearly $9 million acquired through racketeering.77 The Eighth Circuit
held that the forfeiture did not violate the Eighth Amendment.78 The court
did not review for excessiveness, however, because it found that the Eighth
Amendment did not contain any proportionality principle for sentences
less severe than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.79
The Supreme Court held that the in personam forfeiture was “clearly”
a monetary punishment akin to a traditional fine and therefore within the
scope of the Excessive Fines Clause.80 The Court again declined to specify

70. Id. at 622–23.
71. Id. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 628.
75. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993).
76. Id. at 547.
77. Id. at 548. The court also sentenced Alexander to six years in prison and
fined him $100,000. Id.
78. Id. at 549.
79. Alexander v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 825, 836 (8th Cir. 1991).
80. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558–59.

2016]

RESTITUTION AND THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE

31

the appropriate test to measure for excessiveness and instead remanded the
matter back to the court of appeals.81
In United States v. Bajakajian, the Court finally provided guidance on
how to measure excessiveness under the Excessive Fines Clause.82 The
respondent, Hosep Bajakajian, pleaded guilty to one count of willfully
failing to report that he was transporting more than $10,000 out of the
country.83 Customs inspectors caught Bajakajian attempting to board an
international flight with $357,144 on his person and in his checked
baggage.84 Although the district court found that the currency was not
otherwise connected to unlawful activity, the entire amount was statutorily
forfeitable because it was connected to the offense of failing to report.85
The court found that forfeiture of the full amount would be grossly
disproportionate to the offense conduct and instead ordered Bajakajian to
forfeit $15,000 in addition to a fine of $5,000 and a probationary sentence
of three years.86
In reviewing the forfeiture order, the Ninth Circuit applied a
forfeiture-specific test for excessiveness. This test asked whether the
forfeited property was an instrumentality of the offense and whether the
forfeited property’s value was proportional to the owner’s culpability.87
The court found that the currency was not an instrumentality of the offense
and therefore was not forfeitable.88 The Ninth Circuit found that the
offense of failing to report currency was directed at the withholding of
information, not the transportation of money.89 Because Bajakajian did not
challenge the forfeiture through a cross-appeal, however, the court lacked
jurisdiction to set aside the $15,000 forfeiture order.90
Reviewing its thin Excessive Fines jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
noted that it had “never actually applied” the Clause.91 Citing BrowningFerris and Austin, the Court stated that the Clause limits the government’s
power to extract payments as punishment and found that forfeiture fell

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 559.
524 U.S. 321 (1998).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 326.
See United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327.
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within the Clause’s scope.92 The Court rejected the government’s
argument that the currency forfeiture was remedial and noted that even if
the forfeiture was remedial, it would still be punitive in part and thus
within the Clause’s purview.93
The Court then addressed how to measure excessiveness. Stating that
the principle of proportionality is the “touchstone” of the constitutional
inquiry, the Court held that a forfeiture order violates the Excessive Fines
Clause “if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s
offense.”94 Lacking guidance from the text or history of the Clause, the
Court viewed that the legislature deserves deference regarding appropriate
punishment and that judicial measurement of the gravity of an offense is
“inherently imprecise.”95
Applying the test, the Court found that a forfeiture of $357,144 would
be grossly disproportional to Bajakajian’s offense.96 In making this
determination, the Court seemed to base its decision on its intuitive
judgment. The Court limited its analysis to the offense conduct and did not
consider the defendant’s wealth as a factor, noting that the defendant’s
ability to pay had not been argued below or found by the lower courts.97
The Court noted that the harm caused by Bajakajian’s conduct was
relatively minor and that the amount of currency unreported is not
inherently proportional to the harm caused by the failure to report it.98 The
Court mentioned that Bajakajian was “not a money launderer, a drug
trafficker, or a tax evader” and did not “fit into the class of persons for
whom the statute was principally designed.”99 This finding supported the
Court’s determination that forfeiture of the entire amount would be
constitutionally excessive in relation to the offense’s gravity and would
bear “no articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the Government”
because of Bajakajian’s failure to report the currency.100

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 327–28.
Id. at 329 & n.4.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 340 n.15.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339–40.
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B. Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause in the Lower Courts
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause as
a limit on “the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash
or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense’”101 has created disagreement
among the lower courts regarding whether restitution falls within the
compass of the Eighth Amendment. Under this test, the salient questions
are whether a restitution order involves sufficient governmental conduct
and whether a restitution order is punishment.
Many lower courts have found that restitution falls outside the bounds
of the Excessive Fines Clause. For example, some courts have found that
restitution is not part of an Eighth Amendment “fine” because it is paid to
a private victim rather than to the sovereign.102 Other courts have held that
restitution is purely remedial or compensatory in nature and therefore is
not “punishment” implicating the Eighth Amendment.103 Some courts
have reached the opposite conclusions, finding that the Excessive Fines
Clause does apply to restitution orders because the prosecution of the
offense constitutes sufficient governmental involvement104 and the

101. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 609–10 (1993)).
102. See, e.g., Benton v. State, 711 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 1998) (finding that
restitution order was not “to be paid for the benefit of a sovereign” and thus not a
fine); State v. DeAngelis, 747 A.2d 289, 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(“Restitution is paid to the victim, not the State.”).
103. See, e.g., State v. Cottrell, 271 P.3d 1243, 1253–54 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012)
(finding that restitution in Idaho, which is imposed separately from the sentence,
is compensatory in nature and not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause); Benton,
711 A.2d at 799 (holding that a restitution order was not a fine because its purpose
“was remedial and compensatory,” not to “vindicate public justice”); People v.
Stafford, 93 P.3d 572, 574 (Colo. App. 2004) (finding that “for purposes of Eighth
Amendment analysis, restitution is not the equivalent of a fine” because “[a] fine
is solely a monetary penalty, while restitution serves to make the victim whole”);
DeAngelis, 747 A.2d at 296 (“[R]estitution is not meant to punish, but rather to
rehabilitate the criminal.”); United States v. Marron, Nos. CRIM.A. 93-90,
CIV.A. 95-2231, 1996 WL 677511, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 1996) (“[A]n order
to pay restitution is not punishment; rather, restitution is ordered in order to put
the victim in the position she would have been in had the violation not occurred.”).
104. See Montana v. Good, 100 P.3d 644, 649 (Mont. 2004) (finding that
restitution ordered as part of a criminal judgment is within the purview of the
Excessive Fines Clause); see also United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1144–
46 (9th Cir. 1998) (ruling on the merits of the claim that restitution order violated
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purpose of the restitution order is at least partially punitive.105 In short, no
unified approach has emerged from the lower courts regarding restitution
and the Excessive Fines Clause in the years since Bajakajian.106
C. The Paroline Dicta
In April 2014, the Supreme Court decided Paroline v. United States107
and resolved a divisive issue regarding federal restitution to victims of
child pornography offenses.108 Although the Court’s task was to identify
what, if any, causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the
victim’s harm must be established to warrant restitution under the federal
Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, the
opinion contains relevant dicta on restitution and the Excessive Fines
the Excessive Fines Clause without addressing issue of sufficient governmental
involvement).
105. See, e.g., Dubose, 146 F.3d at 1144 (finding that restitution orders under
the federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act are “punishment because the
MVRA has not only remedial, but also deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributive
purposes”); Good, 100 P.3d at 649 (finding that restitution is an “aspect of” an
offender’s punishment and therefore punitive in part); see also Wright v.
Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 915 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that payments into
Washington’s Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund were punitive and subject to
Eighth Amendment scrutiny); United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259–60
(11th Cir. 1998) (finding that restitution under the federal Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act is a criminal penalty for purposes of ex post facto clause analysis);
United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).
106. The lower courts’ treatment of the Excessive Fines Clause following
Bajakajian has been described as “disorder” and “a quagmire.” Beth A. Colgan,
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277, 295 & n.92 (2014).
107. 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
108. In the years leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Paroline, the
issue of the appropriate amount of restitution for possessors of child pornography
spawned a small canon of literature. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, James R. Marsh &
Jeremy M. Christiansen, The Case for Full Restitution for Child Pornography
Victims, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61 (2013); Cortney E. Lollar, Child Pornography
and the Restitution Revolution, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343 (2013);
Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, Rethinking Restitution in Cases of Child
Pornography Possession, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215 (2013); Jonathan R.
Hornok, Note, A Right to Contribution and Federal Restitution Orders, 2013
UTAH L. REV. 661; Melanie Reid & Curtis L. Collier, When Does Restitution
Become Retribution?, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 653 (2012); Dennis F. DiBari, Note,
Restoring Restitution: The Role of Proximate Causation in Child Pornography
Cases Where Restitution is Sought, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 297 (2011).
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Clause.109 The issue arose when an individual portrayed in images of child
pornography sought a restitution award of nearly $3.4 million from an
offender convicted of possessing the pornographic material.110 The district
court denied the restitution request and found that the defendant, who
played no role in producing the pornography and had never met the victim,
did not proximately cause the victim’s harm.111 Acting en banc, the Fifth
Circuit disagreed and held that, under the federal statute, the defendant had
to pay restitution for the full amount of the victim’s losses without any
showing of proximate causation.112 The Fifth Circuit dispatched concerns
from both the government and the defendant that a restitution order
without proximate causation would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.
Reasoning that the purpose of restitution “is remedial, not punitive,” the
court held that the Excessive Fines Clause was not implicated.113
Despite the Supreme Court’s review being limited to the issue of
whether the statute required proximate causation,114 the Court’s opinion in
Paroline contains meaningful dicta regarding the Excessive Fines Clause.
The Court rejected the victim’s requested approach, which would hold
each possessor of child pornography responsible for restitution for all the
harms associated with the creation and circulation of the images.115 The
Court stated that this approach is “so severe it might raise questions under

109. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725–26.
110. Id. at 1718.
111. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 791–93 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
112. See In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 772–73 (5th Cir. 2012).
113. Id. at 771.
114. Paroline v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (granting certiorari and
limiting the question presented).
115. The Court adopted an approach “[i]n this special context” of harms
caused by the continued circulation of images of child pornography “where it is
impossible to trace a particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant”
in which a court “should order restitution in an amount that comports with the
defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general
losses.” Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1726. This approach has been widely criticized as
essentially unworkable by sentencing courts. See, e.g., United States v. Baslan,
No 13 CR 220(RJD), 2015 WL 1258158, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2015)
(“District courts have proven quite frustrated by the restitution assessment
instructions laid out in Paroline.” (collecting cases)); Paul G. Cassell & James R.
Marsh, Full Restitution for Child Pornography Victims: The Supreme Court’s
Paroline Decision and the Need for a Congressional Response, 13 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 5, 5 (2015) (“Exactly what [the Paroline] holding means is not
immediately clear, and lower courts are currently struggling to interpret it.”).
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the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”116 The Court noted
that although criminal restitution is not payable to the government, it
nevertheless implicates the government’s prosecutorial powers, and thus
appears to fall within the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause.117 The Court
also noted that restitution serves punitive purposes even though its
“primary goal” is remedial or compensatory.118 Citing Bajakajian, the
Court stated that the partially punitive purpose of restitution “may” be
sufficient to render it subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.119
III. APPLYING THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO RESTITUTION
The Paroline dicta strongly suggests that restitution ordered after a
criminal conviction is within the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. This
result is sensible. Although restitution is paid to the victim, the restitution
order results from the government’s power to criminally prosecute. As a
check against abuse of governmental power, the Excessive Fines Clause
limits the government’s ability to extract restitution payments from
criminal defendants.120 And, as the Paroline Court rightly noted, restitution
orders serve punitive as well as compensatory purposes.121 Restitution
orders not only deter offense conduct, but also are a component of an
offender’s punishment and may further rehabilitation.122 Indeed, many
116. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1726.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Aside from the Paroline dicta, the historical record raises questions about
the accurateness of restricting the application of the Excessive Fines Clause to
payments to the government. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 299 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (opining that “the identity of the recipient of a monetary penalty
is irrelevant for purposes of determining the constitutional validity of the
penalty”); Colgan, supra note 106, at 300–10 (surveying the historical record and
finding that “[t]he actual practice in the colonies and early American states belies
the Court’s restriction of fines to sanctions payable to the sovereign”).
121. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1726; cf. Colgan, supra note 106, at 310–19
(drawing from historical records to question whether a punitive purpose is a
proper component of the Excessive Fines Clause analysis).
122. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986) (“Restitution is an
effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in
concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.”) (cited by Paroline, 134 S. Ct.
at 1727); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:61-a(I) (2016) (noting that
restitution to the victim “can operate to rehabilitate the offender”); Note, Victim
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restitution statutes require the court to consider whether an order will further
these punitive goals.123 Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment to date, the partially punitive nature of restitution and
the government’s role in its imposition are sufficient to implicate the
Excessive Fines Clause.124
A. Identifying the Test
If restitution orders are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, the next
major determination to tackle is identifying what test applies to measure their
constitutionality. One option is to apply the same “gross disproportionality”
test that was applied in Bajakajian in the context of a criminal forfeiture.125
Another option is to craft a new test specific to restitution.
Fines, forfeitures, and restitution orders are similar in that they all deal
in money or assets. They are all also criminal punishments, at least in part.
Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV.
931, 937–41 (1984) [hereinafter Victim Restitution] (explaining restitution’s
ability to achieve deterrent, rehabilitative, and retributivist objectives); see also
Lollar, supra note 45, at 117 (noting that “the lack of concrete or consistent
methodology for calculating restitution” under the current statutory schemes
creates an opening “for moral condemnation to slip in to criminal restitution
decisions”).
123. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:61-a(I) (2016) (finding in statement of
purpose “that repayment, in whole or in part, by the offender to the victim can
operate to rehabilitate the offender”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-37-3(2)(c) (West
2016) (requiring the court to taken into account “[t]he rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment”); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-08(1)(c) (West 2016) (requiring courts to consider “[t]he
likelihood that attaching a condition relating to restitution or reparation will serve
a valid rehabilitational purpose in the case of the particular offender considered”);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(B)(3) (2016) (permitting courts to consider “the
anticipated rehabilitative effect on the defendant regarding the manner of
restitution or the method of payment”); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-118(a)
(West 2016) (clearly stating that restitution “is a part of the punishment for any
offense committed in this state”); Victim Restitution, supra note 122, at 939 n.64
(collecting statutes).
124. See Lollar, supra note 45, at 149 (urging the Supreme Court to “take the
next step and recognize the constitutional protections that must adhere to criminal
restitution [in] light of its punitive character.”); see also id. at 154 (noting that
“Paroline has given even greater weight to the argument that criminal restitution,
in its current form, needs the protections offered by the Eighth Amendment’s
Excessive Fines Clause”).
125. See supra Part II.A.
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Beyond those similarities, however, the three sanctions are implemented
very differently. Like a sentence of imprisonment, a sentencing court
usually selects an appropriate criminal fine from the legislatively
authorized range associated with the offense of conviction.126 Within that
range, the imposition of a fine is largely a matter of judicial discretion.127
Sentencing courts are often granted much less discretion when it
comes to asset forfeiture and restitution. In forfeiture, the key inquiry is
whether the asset is contraband or the instrumentality or proceeds of a
criminal offense.128 If the asset falls within one of those categories, then
the asset is forfeitable.129 In restitution, the key inquiry is whether the
victim’s harm was a proximate result of the offense of conviction.130 If it
was, the offender is usually ordered to compensate the victim for the full
extent of the harm.131 These key inquiries are both binary—yes or no—
and are based on the facts of the case rather than the judgment of the
sentencing court. These decisions differ significantly from the selection of
the amount of a criminal fine, which is largely dependent on the sentencing
court’s evaluation of just punishment for the offense of conviction.132
This distinction does not appear to be meaningful for the Excessive
Fines Clause. In the forfeiture context, the Supreme Court did not adopt
an excessive fines test that depends upon the asset’s relationship to the
offense conduct.133 It declined to adopt Justice Scalia’s “scales of gold”
test from his concurrence in Austin.134 The Court refused to ignore “how

126. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (2012) (setting forth fine ranges for federal
offenses).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(a) (2012) (making the imposition of a fine permissive
rather than mandatory); see also S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344,
2353 (2012) (noting a sentencing court’s authority to impose judgment within the
statutory range of permissible punishments). Note, however, that a sentencing court
lacks the authority to find facts that would increase the maximum fine applicable to
the defendant. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2354–57 (applying the rule from
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) to criminal fines).
128. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982 (2012); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a), 881(a) (2012).
129. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012) (using the
mandatory word “shall” with regard to criminal forfeitures).
130. See supra Part I.
131. See supra Part I.
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (setting forth the factors sentencing courts
consider in imposing a sentence).
133. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
134. See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 627 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring), discussed supra Part II.A.
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much” the confiscated property was worth.135 Rather, the Court adopted a
“gross disproportionality” test that weighs the value of the monetary
penalty against the gravity of the offense conduct.136 In Bajakajian, the
binary inquiry of whether the asset had a sufficiently close relationship to
the offense conduct was not part of the constitutional analysis.137 The
concept of excessiveness is inherently quantitative; proportionality is key
to the analysis.138
The same treatment should apply to restitution orders. Restitution’s
causal question—whether the victim’s harm resulted from the offense—is
statutory, just like forfeiture’s binary question—whether the asset had a
sufficient nexus to the offense—is also statutory. The relevant constitutional
inquiry, however, is always quantitative under the Excessive Fines Clause:
whether the amount of the constitutional “fine” is excessive.139
Some lower courts have unfortunately handled Eighth Amendment
challenges to restitution orders by effectively merging the constitutional
inquiry of excessiveness with the statutory element of causation. These
decisions hold that “where the restitution order reflects the amount of the
victim’s losses no constitutional violation has occurred.”140 According to
135. Id. at 628.
136. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
137. Id. at 334–44.
138. The Supreme Court has employed a similar “gross disproportionality”
test to some sentences of imprisonment under the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.” See Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it
forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”);
see also Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal
Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 81–85 (2012) (overviewing the Supreme
Court’s opinions regarding the role of gross disproportionality in assessing
whether a term of incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). Using
the same test to measure the constitutionality of punishment under both clauses
raises the problem of redundancy. If a punishment that is grossly disproportional
to the gravity of an offense is cruel and unusual, then the excessive fines clause is
essentially redundant because all excessive fines would also be cruel and unusual.
A flaw lies either in the drafting of the Eighth Amendment or its interpretation.
139. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
140. United States v. Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 35 (1st Cir. 2011); see also United
States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 899 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[S]o long as the government
proved that the victim suffered the actual loss that the defendant has been ordered
to pay, the restitution is proportional.”); United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141,
1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n the restitution context, because the full amount of
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the First Circuit, “[t]his is not surprising, as restitution is inherently
proportional, insofar as the point of restitution is to restore the victim to
the status quo ante.”141 One federal district court even stated that “[b]y
choosing his target [in the case of arson], the defendant is the one who
essentially determines his restitution obligation.”142 Although this
approach does not render causation a constitutional requirement, it does
render causation constitutionally sufficient. This analysis compares the
size of the “fine” to the amount of the victim’s loss. In doing so, it skews
the analysis away from excessiveness to causality and focuses on the
wrong type proportionality. Rather than comparing the restitution order to
the gravity of the offense conduct, it compares the restitution order to the
extent of the victim’s loss.
This approach overlooks the key component of the Excessive Fines
Clause—proportionality with the gravity of the offense conduct143—and
instead creates a self-fulfilling feedback loop between the statutory
authorization for restitution and the constitutional inquiry. As long as the
sanction is at least partially punitive, the excessiveness inquiry is
unconcerned with why the money was ordered to be paid. Only the amount
matters. The causation requirement built into restitution statutes is a
reflection of the compensatory or remedial aspect of restitution, whereas
the Excessive Fines Clause focuses on the punitive aspect of monetary

restitution is inherently linked to the culpability of the offender, restitution orders
that require full compensation in the amount of the loss are not excessive.”);
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 205 (3d Cir. 2007); United State v.
Dighlawi, 452 Fed. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that restitution order
was proportional in Eighth Amendment analysis because it “was directly based
upon the losses the victims suffered as a result of the criminal conspiracy that
would not have been successfully accomplished without [the defendant’s]
participation”); Benton v. State, 711 A.2d 792, 799 (Del. 1997) (finding that
because a restitution order “was based directly on the actual losses” that it was
therefore proportionate to the defendant’s conduct).
141. Newell, 658 F.3d at 35.
142. United States v. Dean, 949 F. Supp. 782, 786 (D. Or. 1996) (imposing
restitution obligation of $121,403 for losses caused by defendant’s arson). The
court further explained that “[w]here the amount of restitution is geared directly
to the amount of the victim’s loss caused by the defendant’s illegal activity,
proportionality is already built into the order.” Id.
143. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 (“The touchstone of the constitutional
inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense
that it is designed to punish.”).
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sanctions. Constitutional excessiveness is concerned with monetary
quantity weighed against culpability, not against causation.144
Proportionality with the victim’s losses is a remedial or compensatory
aspect of restitution, not a punitive one. As in tort law, this type of
proportionality ensures that the victim is not overcompensated nor the
offender overcharged. Non-punitive aspects of restitution have no place in
the constitutional inquiry. Rather, the governing inquiry is the punitive
question: whether the payment is proportionate to the gravity of the
offense. In many cases, the two questions will overlap because the gravity
of the offense is not wholly divorced from the injuries proximately caused
by the offense. Keeping the statutory and constitutional inquiries
conceptually distinct, however, is important.145
B. Establishing the “Fine”
When applying the gross disproportionality test, the court must first
establish the amount of the constitutional “fine.” The term “constitutional
fine” is used here as a distinct entity from the fine portion of a criminal
sentence, which is referred to as a “criminal fine.” To properly calculate
the constitutional “fine,” the court should engage in “fine pooling”—
aggregating all monetary sanctions that compose the constitutional “fine”
under the Eighth Amendment. These sanctions often include a criminal
fine, an asset forfeiture order, and an order of restitution.146 It is
nonsensical for a court to separately analyze in the same prosecution
whether a forfeiture order violates the Excessive Fines Clause and whether

144. See id.
145. Hypotheticals can be conjured involving minor offense conduct that is the
proximate result of large economic losses or harms. One example is making a
right turn on red and consequently running over the Mona Lisa. Improperly
disposing of an unextinguished cigarette butt and unintentionally starting a forest
fire is another.
146. The Excessive Fines Clause “fine” may also include other monetary
consequences of conviction. See Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a Washington statute imposing a 5% deduction from all funds that
inmates receive from outside sources as a contribution to a victim compensation
fund was subject to Excessive Fines Clause); see also Colgan, supra note 106, at
286–88 (describing types of fees and costs); cf. United States v. Brown, 423 F.
App’x 264, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2011) (expressing doubt that federal special
assessment of $100 per felony conviction implicates the Excessive Fines Clause
and finding that, regardless, it would not be excessive).
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a restitution order violates the Excessive Fines Clause.147 To analyze
excessiveness, all economic sanctions must be aggregated together
because they collectively constitute the “fine” under the Eighth
Amendment.
C. Weighing the Fine Against the Gravity of the Offense
The Supreme Court purposefully padded the gross disproportionality
standard, leaving room for judicial discretion.148 According to the Court,
two principles support the gross disproportionality standard rather than a
standard of strict proportionality: first, “judgments about the appropriate
punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature,”
and second, “any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a
particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.”149
One set of guideposts that courts traditionally use to measure the
gravity of an offense are the statutory penalties, usually the maximum term of
incarceration or the maximum fine. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that
“[i]n considering an offense’s gravity, the other penalties that the Legislature
has authorized are certainly relevant evidence.”150 Unfortunately, some courts
read this statement too expansively and find that any monetary fine within the
statutory limits is inherently non-excessive and constitutional.151 The Seventh
Circuit has summarized this approach: “[W]e can’t say the fine is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense when Congress has made a
judgment about the appropriate punishment.”152
As with the error of engrafting the statutory causation standard into
the constitutional test,153 the approach of total deference to the legislature
in defining appropriate punishment improperly collapses the constitutional
inquiry into a statutory one. A fine is not inherently non-excessive simply
147. See, e.g., United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 417–19 (4th Cir. 2001)
(separately analyzing a $1.2 million forfeiture order and a $783,545 restitution
order for constitutional excessiveness).
148. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336–37.
149. Id. at 336.
150. Id. at 336 n.14.
151. Federal appellate courts have rejected all Excessive Fines Clause
challenges when the fine imposed fell within statutory boundaries. Colleen P.
Murphy, Reviewing Congressionally Created Remedies for Excessiveness, 73
OHIO ST. L.J. 651, 701 (2012).
152. Kelly v. U.S. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Murphy,
supra note 151, at 698–99 & n.262 (2012) (listing cases).
153. See supra Part III.A.
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because the legislature has authorized it as punishment for the convicted
offense, and total deference to the legislature is generally inappropriate.154
Although elected through a democratic system, the legislature is an arm of the
government. As a check on governmental power, the Eighth Amendment
places limits on the legislature’s ability to punish excessively. Indeed, the
Supreme Court did not resolve Bajakajian on the ground of whether the
legislature authorized the forfeiture—that is, whether the $357,144 was an
instrumentality of the offense of failing to report taking it out of the country.155
Rather, the Court offered its independent judgment about whether forfeiture
of the full amount would be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
offense.156
Moreover, statutory categories of offenses are broad, and the harshest
authorized punishment for an offense may be excessive when applied to an
offender who commits the offense’s least severe version.157 The sentencing
guidelines of many jurisdictions would provide a more nuanced guidepost for
determining the seriousness of offense conduct. For example, in the federal
system the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual
provides an advisory punishment range based on the intersection of the
seriousness of an offender’s offense conduct, the “offense level,” and past
criminal convictions, the “criminal history category.”158 Offense levels are
graded on a scale of one to 43.159 Each offense is assigned a “base offense
level.”160 The base offense level may then be increased or, less commonly,
reduced based on specific offense characteristics or other adjustments to arrive
at the total offense level.161 A defendant’s total offense level provides a more
refined window into the seriousness of a specific defendant’s offense conduct
154. See Colgan, supra note 106, at 347 (noting an “overreliance on legislative
enactments” in measuring for excessiveness).
155. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337–40.
156. Id.
157. For example, a person who willfully violates securities law may be fined
up to $5,000,000. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2012). For an organizational defendant, the
fine may be up to $25,000,000. Id. Such a maximum fine may be excessive when
imposed for the least serious versions of these offenses.
158. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
159. Id.
160. Id. ch. 2, introductory cmt.
161. Id. For example, the offense of kidnapping carries a base offense level of
32 and additional offense levels may be warranted depending upon the extent of
the victim’s injuries, whether ransom was demanded from the government, the
length of the kidnapping, and other factors. Id. § 2A4.1.
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than a broad and generic statutory range does.162 The Guidelines also provide
an advisory fine range based on the defendant’s offense level.163 These ranges,
although quite wide,164 provide further insight into what the Commission
deems to be an appropriate fine for each level of offense conduct.
In the final analysis, judges should be allowed to exercise their own
judgment in determining the constitutionality of the aggregated monetary
sanction. Although the statutory maximum and the Guidelines provide ex ante
guidance on offense gravity, these guideposts should not end or even
necessarily dominate the inquiry. Even if offense gravity was quantifiable
with precision, balancing it against the dollar amount of a monetary sanction
is inherently imprecise. Judges must be trusted to apply the gross
disproportionality standard, which was purposefully devised so that the
concept of “gross” functions as a cushion.165 Only utterly disproportionate
fines are constitutionally excessive.166 In sentencing, judicial discretion is
162. The Bajakajian Court recognized this principle and referenced the
defendant’s maximum sentence under the Guidelines as confirmation that he had
“only a minimal level of culpability.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 338–39; see also
United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 418 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting the defendant’s
maximum term of imprisonment and fine under the Guidelines as support for its
determination regarding the gravity of the offense).
163. U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(c)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2015).
164. The fine table for individual defendants generally provides a fine range
with a ceiling that is ten times larger than the floor. Id.
165. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.
166. One point of contention has been what role, if any, the defendant’s ability
to pay should play in the inquiry. The Supreme Court sidestepped the issue in
Bajakajian because the defendant did not raise it and the district court made no
factual findings on the issue. Id. at 340 n.15. Some courts have held that the ability
to pay is relevant to a fine’s constitutionality. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 88
F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1996) (“In imposing a fine . . . ability to pay becomes a
critical factor.”). Other courts have found that the defendant’s ability to pay is
completely irrelevant to the excessiveness inquiry, at least for forfeitures. See,
e.g., United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e
do not take into account the personal impact of a forfeiture on the specific
defendant in determining whether the forfeiture violates the Eighth
Amendment.”); see also City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sainez, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d
418, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Other courts have inquired into whether the
payment would deprive defendants of their livelihoods when reviewing the
constitutionality of forfeiture orders. See, e.g., United States v. Levesque, 546
F.3d 78, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2008). The basis for finding ability to pay to be relevant
springs from analysis of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Magna Carta.
See id.; Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
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often treated as a cause for concern.167 In response to concerns about the
disparate treatment of similarly situated offenders,168 legislatures enacted
stiffer mandatory minimum sentences and binding sentencing guidelines.169
The totality of the circumstances must govern the gross disproportionality test,
however, and that totality cannot be predicted and quantified in advance. No
guidelines are necessary to accomplish this task, nor would they be adequate.
Rather, an able judiciary must bring its own independent judgment to bear.
CONCLUSION
Restitution is a component of criminal defendants’ punishment and the
product of government action. Therefore, restitution, along with traditional
criminal fines and forfeitures, falls within the compass of the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. When testing for constitutionality, courts
should aggregate all economic sanctions and then test for gross
disproportionality between the total amount of the aggregated constitutional
“fine” and the gravity of the defendant’s offense conduct. Although certain
guideposts may aid courts in the gross disproportionality inquiry, courts
should not abdicate their decision-making duty by simply accepting
legislatively prescribed ranges of appropriate punishment. Rather, judges
should exercise their sound judgment in the matter.
289 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Scholars have
uncovered contemporaneous statutes and judicial decisions to support inquiry into
the defendant’s ability to pay. See Colgan, supra note 106, at 330–35 (concluding
that “the idea of saving defendants from persistent impoverishment was a guiding
principle reaching back to the days of the Magna Carta and the English Bill of
Rights, and enduring through the ratification of the Eighth Amendment”);
Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 835 (2013) (finding the
First Circuit’s approach “significantly more faithful to the history and purpose of
the Excessive Fines Clause”). Given the recent depth of scholarly treatment on
the topic, this Article has little to add to the discussion of whether inquiry into the
defendant’s ability to pay is relevant. However, if ability to pay is relevant (and a
strong historical basis appears to support that it was relevant at the time of the Bill
of Rights), then the “fine pooling” approach described in this Article should be
used to ensure that the full amount of the Eighth Amendment “fine” is considered
in the analysis.
167. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES,
STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 139–220 (3d ed. 2013) (chronicling the regulation of
judicial discretion in non-capital sentencing).
168. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973).
169. See DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 167, at 145–49, 161–67.

